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MINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 17 FEBRUARY 1950

1. There was no formal agenda for this meeting.

I. SECURITY OF THE SOURCES OF CIA [REDACTED] REPORTS

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The DCI stated that there had been instances in the recent past where [REDACTED] reports had got out of intelligence channels. He went on to say that such instances are damaging in that the subject matter of these reports is obtained from the various sources with the understanding that the reports will be made available only to the intelligence organizations of the U. S. Government. [REDACTED]

The intelligence agencies should remember that the reports transmit unevaluated information and are intended to be used only as the raw material for intelligence production. If they are used properly, no breach of security will result.

3. There was some discussion and the DCI answered several questions, elaborating on his statement.

4. Action: The members of the IAC took note of the statement by the DCI.

II. SERVICE ATTACHES IN THE SATELLITE NATIONS

5. GENERAL CANELL stated that he would like to get an expression of IAC opinion concerning the recent proposal of the Department of State to reduce the allotted strength of the Service Attache detachments in the Satellite countries. He felt that the strength of these detachments should not be reduced, since they were extremely valuable in the collection of military information.

6. MR. ARMSTRONG expounded on the reasons for the proposal of the Department of State. He said that none of these detachments is now up to strength, since the host governments will not issue visas for the necessary

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replacements. The State Department has come to the conclusion that the existing restraints on the Attaches are sure to be maintained until we come to some agreement with the host governments as to strength. Moreover, with agreement, we should have less trouble getting visas for replacements. As matters stand, the governments concerned seem to feel that our allotted strengths are disproportionate to the similar representation of other Western nations and to their own views as to what is maximum for us. As long as they continue to feel this way, they will undoubtedly maintain the existing restraints, and, consequently, the effectiveness of our missions, diplomatic as well as military, will continue to be reduced by their action. It appears that we must adjust ourselves to sacrificing quantity, while concentrating on quality.

7. GENERAL CABELL expressed his disagreement with the line of reasoning of the Department of State, the crux of his argument being that he believed a reduction in one satellite would simply lead to reductions in others. Thus there might be a continuously recurring cycle of reductions which would accomplish nothing except to prejudice our ability to collect information.

8. GENERAL IRWIN said that he thought the IAC should not debate the strength of the detachments, but should express itself as to the general usefulness of the Attache system, particularly in the satellites. Such an expression of authoritative opinion would be of considerable value in countering the "cookie pusher" concept of the Service Attaches, and also, he understood, such expression was wanted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for use as the basis of a reply to the proposal of the Department of State. He read from a study he had had prepared on the subject, which demonstrated the great value of the detachments as collection facilities.

9. Following further discussion, it was agreed that appropriate advisory personnel present at the meeting should withdraw from the conference room to draft a letter to the Secretary of Defense, expressing the opinion of the IAC along the lines suggested by General Irwin. This was done.

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10. While the letter was being drafted the discussion was continued. An agreement was reached between Mr. Armstrong and the Service members of the IAC to the effect that current visa applications for the entry of replacements into [REDACTED] would be withdrawn, and that, for the present, new applications for visas would be submitted only for the purpose of maintaining the strength recommended by the State Department for the Service Attache detachment in [REDACTED]. As for the detachments in the other satellites, the military members preferred that we remain in a position where our applications for visas represent pressure upon those governments. They felt that in no case [REDACTED] should we reduce allotted strengths, either unilaterally or in consultation with the governments concerned.

11. Action: The IAC approved the draft of a letter to the Secretary of Defense. The DCI agreed to dispatch the letter over his signature. (Copies of the letter have been furnished the IAC Members.)

III. CRISIS PROCEDURES

12. GENERAL CAMELL initiated a discussion on crisis procedures, to which GENERAL IRWIN contributed considerably, concerning a report from [REDACTED]

13. GENERAL IRWIN stated that he would appreciate a liberal use of crisis procedures so that any item of information of apparent importance could be placed in its proper perspective.

14. Action: The IAC took no action on the subject.

IV. SITUATION REPORTS

15. GENERAL IRWIN stated that he had circulated a memorandum, dated 10 February 1950, proposing that the Situation Report (SR) program be discontinued with the issuance of the four reports already being coordinated.

16. The DCI replied that the program would be completed as announced in his circular memorandum of 5 January 1950 (ER-O-8268). He had been informed by his advisers that the preparation of the reports was necessary, and he felt that they should prove useful in the absence of National Intel-

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ligence Survey (NIS) reports for the countries concerned. He would welcome the collaboration of the intelligence agencies in the preparation of the reports, but if the agencies could not collaborate, CIA would proceed unilaterally.

17. Both GENERAL IRWIN and GENERAL CANELL made the rejoinder that the reports would not be useful to their services without their collaboration. They were adverse to extending collaboration due to the fact that such effort would compete with the NIS production. Furthermore, they could not understand why CIA should proceed unilaterally in the absence of agreement that the reports were required.

18. The DCI stated his definite opinion that basic intelligence in some form should be issued as envisaged in the present SR program, in the absence of the appropriate NIS reports. He went on to say that if CIA has the capability of producing the necessary SR's there is no acceptable excuse for the void in basic intelligence which would exist if CIA did not produce them. If the intelligence agencies could not collaborate, that was their responsibility.

19. Subsequent discussion developed the idea that the current JCS consideration of NIS priorities under the monitorship of the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) might cause the production of NIS reports on certain countries to be raised in priority.

20. GENERAL IRWIN asked the DCI if CIA would revise the SR program to omit the preparation of SR's on those countries which were placed adequately high on the revised NIS priority list.

21. The DCI averred that it was never the intention of CIA to produce SR's if the appropriate NIS reports were to be forthcoming in the near future. Meanwhile, CIA had no idea as to what revisions of NIS priorities were contemplated by the JIG, although the Agency would take appropriate action to amend the SR program when the revised priorities were received.

22. Action: The members of the IAC took note of the attitude expressed by the DCI. All agreed that the new JCS priority list would be a determining

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factor in this matter.

V. THE PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR JTF 3

23. GENERAL MAGEE stated that there was some confusion as to the provision of intelligence for JTF 3. The JIG had received a request from the intelligence organization of the Air Force to undertake the monitorship of the provision of intelligence for this command. As the first step in accomplishing this task, General Magee dispatched his memorandum of 3 February 1950 (DDM 222). After this memorandum was received by CIA, the JIG was notified that CIA was already involved in the production of the necessary intelligence and that this work was begun several months ago as the result of a request made by General Quesada, in command of JTF 3, upon the DCI. Apparently General Quesada had made duplicate requests in the matter, having addressed himself to General Cabell as well as to the DCI. It would not appear sensible for both the JIG and CIA to concern themselves with this task. Since CIA had already done considerable work in the matter, and because it extends beyond just the military aspects of the problem, it seemed a good decision for the JIG simply to withdraw.

24. GENERAL CABELL could not bring himself to agree with General Magee without a decision by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) based on further study of the matter. He felt that there were a number of angles to be considered, one of these being the fact that besides the provision of an initial estimate, this task would call for a day to day intelligence service to be rendered to JTF 3.

25. GENERAL MAGEE suggested that if the non-military members of the IAC agreed, the members of the JIC might discuss the matter then and there and come to some conclusion.

26. GENERAL IRWIN was inclined to agree with General Magee's suggestions, both as to disposing of the matter during the current meeting of the IAC and as to CIA's continuance of the task.

27. GENERAL CABELL adhered to the view that the members of the JIC were insufficiently well informed as to the implications of the project to

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reach a decision without further study.

28. GENERAL IRWIN acceded to General Cabell's wishes, stating that as Chairman of the JIC he would call an early meeting of that body to dispose of the matter. He asked the DCI if he would continue with the work already started in the absence of a decision by the JIC.

29. The DCI generally abstained from this discussion on the basis that any decision was a matter for the JIC. He did, however, make it clear that CIA was quite willing to render the service requested by General Quesada and would continue the work already begun until, for some reason, it appeared to be a proper decision to call it off.

30. Action: The IAC took note of the discussion on this subject, and the statement of the DCI that CIA would continue work on the project.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
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1	Director	<i>[Signature]</i>	6 Apr 50
2	Ch. / COAPS		
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FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, COAPS		
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REMARKS: